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Abstract 
Agriculture is the largest consumer of water. Since water demand for irrigational purposes is expected to rise and given the fact 
that freshwater is not an unlimited resource, conflicts about the use of water and allocation issues are becoming more intense. 
The present paper examines the potential for water conflict when water consumption for irrigation takes place. In order to 
contribute to the discussion on this issue, game theory is used as a platform that provides predictions about strategies of irrigation 
followed by stakeholders. Previously published research work on game theory applications analyzing agricultural water rights is 
reviewed. The paper also discusses the nature and characteristics of selected games. The goal of this article is to highlight the 
evolution of game theory application in irrigation and contribute to the discussion about resolving resource conflicts generated by 
irrigated agriculture. The results of this analysis may be appreciated by policy makers for creative problem solving about water 
use in the field of irrigation management. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Technological Educational Institute of Epirus, Hydroconcept R&D (www.hydroconcept.gr) 
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1.  Introduction 
Water plays an essential role, both for humanity’s survival and prosperity. Its close involvement to the processes 
of Life and its strong interaction with bio-societies reflects its vital significance. Welfare is constrained directly by 
access to safe water supply. Early great civilizations had been developed and evolved along rivers, lakes, deltas and 
seas. By the very early, they understood the importance of water and adapted their structure and economies to the 
water flow and supply (water-centric economies). Over the time, humans have learned to control water in order to 
satisfy their needs (including agricultural, industrial, household, recreational and environmental activities) and 
developed methods to harvest, transport, store, treat and manage fresh water resources (rainwater, river water, spring 
water and groundwater). Hence, nowadays modern societies are characterized by the level of integrated water 
resources management plan approach they follow. However, still they have to face up with several problems 
concerning water. 
In a rapidly changing world, with growing population, fast-rising world food demand, rapid urbanization and 
industrialization, expansion of business activity and technological progress, increase of pollution and deforestation, 
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climate change and change in precipitation patterns, extreme events, depletion of water resources and water quality 
deterioration, there are alarming messages about water crisis. Access to reliable and safe water becomes one of the 
critical challenges of the 21st century. Since there are too many interdependencies (externalities) among water uses 
and the fact that water in not always available at the ‘right’ time and the ‘right’ location, water users have to share 
water, this valuable and vital resource, at different levels of access. This variation about the distribution of water, its 
availability, its qualitative characteristics and the composition of its sectorial use contributes to the arising of 
conflicts among water users. The risks for abusing the available fresh water are getting higher and water scarcity 
affects the living standards. In such a case, the number and level of conflicts are quite likely to be elevated in the 
future. Because water is so essential to agricultural sector, conflicts and disputes over the use of irrigation water tend 
also to arise. Conflicts take place in several levels: on local, inter-state or international level (i.e. disputes between 
upstream and downstream irrigators or between two countries sharing a water body), between sectors (i.e. 
agricultural versus industrial water use), among competing economic and social interests (i.e. to invest on small-
scale irrigation schemes or not), etc.  
The present paper examines conflicts that take place over irrigation water. The following approach is under game 
theoretical perspective. Game theory offers insights into any economic, political, or social situation that involves 
individuals who have different goals or preferences and make decisions that will influence one another's welfare 
(Myerson, 1991) and, for that reason, it serves in a better understanding of conflict. Discussion on the evolution of 
game theory applications in irrigation may help in better understanding of past and present dilemmas about water 
consumption. The goal of this article is to contribute to the discussion about resolving conflicts generated by 
irrigated agriculture. Previously published research work on game theory applications, analyzing agricultural water 
rights, is reviewed. Reviewing cases of recent empirical studies could assist in better understanding of research 
direction over such issues. The results of this analysis may be appreciated by policy makers for creative problem 
solving about water use in the field of irrigation management. 
Section 2 briefly emphasizes the contribution of irrigation to our livelihood, demonstrates some basic irrigation 
statistics and discusses the arising conflicts. Section 3 briefly describes some basic concepts about game theory. 
Section 4 gives examples of typical games in agriculture water and focuses on published research work on game 
theory and irrigation issues. Section 5 presents conclusions. 
2. Irrigation: water for agriculture, a cause of conflict 
2.1. Irrigation statistics 
Agriculture is responsible for approximately 70% of water withdrawals, but 90% of the water consumption 
(FAO, 2014). This account of water abstraction for satisfying agricultural needs goes up to 95% in developing 
countries. These statistics, illustrated in Fig.1, reflect that agriculture is the sector with by far the largest water 
Fig. 1. Global sum of water withdrawals and the global map of irrigation in percentage of land area (Siebert et al, 2013). 
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withdrawal and consumptive water use. Irrigation is used in order to counterbalance the lack of precipitation in 
cultivated areas and improve food production around world. For that reason, it takes the lion’s share of water use in 
agriculture sector, depending on the characteristics on each country (Dinar et al., 2013). Table 1 lists briefly the 
benefits and adverse effects of irrigation. In order to exploit the benefits of irrigation, the latter should be managed 
carefully to avoid or reverse environmental damages and abuse of water resources. 
According to data collected from 165 countries around the world for year 2012 by AQUASTAT database (FAO, 
2014) the total irrigated area is estimated 299 Mha and the annual irrigation water withdrawal is about 2672 km3. At 
world continent level, Asia abstracts 76% of total irrigation water (2026 km3/year), Americas 15% (397 km3/year), 
Africa 6.5% (171 km3/year), Europe 2.5% (69 km3/year) and Oceania 0.3% (9 km3/year). The analysis of statistical 
global survey data about density of irrigation areas is illustrated in Fig. 1, produced by Siebert et al (2013). This 
geospatial information on position and extend of irrigated areas shows that irrigation water use per unit of surface 
area is largest in arid regions with high cropping intensity. i.e. Egypt, Pakistan, India, Mexico, just to name a few, in 
which the risk of drought is relatively high. High cropping intensity, powered by irrigation ensures food production. 
According to FAO (2007), food production has increased by more than 100% in the last 30 years. FAO also 
estimates that the world's growing population will require about 50% more food by 2030 compared to 1998. To 
cover this requirement, 70% of gains in cereal production are expected to come from irrigated land the next 30 
years. It is estimated that irrigated land in developing countries will increase by 34% by 2030, but the amount of 
water used by agriculture will increase by only 14%, thanks to improved irrigation practices. 
2.2.  Irrigation conflicts 
Conflicts in irrigation are as old as the irrigation agriculture itself. Actually, sharing a body of water, for 
agricultural purposes, dates from the time of first land-holding farmers. It is noticeable that the words ‘rival’ and 
‘rivalry’ which mean ‘competitor’ and ‘conflict’, respectively, originate from the latin world ‘rivalis’ which meant 
one who uses a stream in common with another, equivalent to ‘rīvus’ i.e. ‘stream’ plus ‘-alis’ i.e. a suffix with the 
general sense ‘of the kind of’. The original meaning was sharing, but it was evolved in competitiveness and conflict 
(Bolton, 2010). 
The first recorded dispute in antiquity took place between the cities of Umma and Lagash in the Middle East over 
irrigation systems and diversion of water from Tigris and Emphratis rivers. That dispute had lasted for 100 years 
from 2500 to 2400 B.C. Continuing conflicts over Mesopotamia through passing of years led Hammurabi the king 
of ancient Babylon in 1790 B.C. to enforce laws prohibiting water theft in irrigation systems, in his famous 
‘Hammurabi’s Code’ (Hatami and Gleick, 1994). An early example of water value for cities versus farms is the 
famous dispute about irrigation water rights, in eastern California. It dates in the late of 19th century and was 
continued till 1926 between the city of Los Angeles that was growing continuously and farmers and ranchers in the 
Owens Valley of Eastern California. The cause of conflict was the fact that agriculture was starting to fall 
Table 1. Irrigation pros & cons. 
 
Benefits Adverse effects 
Gives higher yields in crops and boosts agricultural productivity Provokes waterlogging and depletion of water sources 
Increases food production and security Leads to water table lowering 
Provides option for diversification in cropping Contaminates local groundwater basins and stream flows 
Reduces vulnerability to drought phenomena Provokes siltation 
Lessens risk of moisture stress of plants in critical growing periods Provokes salinization and alkalization of land 
Gives higher yields in pasture and increases livestock production Contributes to soil infertility 
Increases surface area for profit exploitation Contributes to erosion of topsoil 
Increases value of land Provokes poor aeration of soil 
Increases farmers income and standard of living Needs investment and maintenance cost 
Increases labor employment Spreads water-borne diseases 
274   Marianthi V. Podimata and Panayotis C. Yannopoulos /  Agriculture and Agricultural Science Procedia  4 ( 2015 )  271 – 281 
dramatically after the construction of an aqueduct that diverted water from the Owens River to Los Angeles. This 
led to farmers' rebelling. They tried to destroy the aqueduct in 1924. Los Angeles had suffered the repeated aqueduct 
bombing, but kept the water flowing. By 1926, Owens Lake was completely dry due to water diversion. Owens 
Valley economy collapsed. The City of Los Angeles continued to purchase private land holdings and water rights of 
farmers in Owens Valley and agriculture interests in the valley were stopped (Reisner, 1993). The continuous 
dispute over irrigation water rights between India and Pakistan was also on the brink of war. The conflicts started in 
1948 and ended up in 1960, after negotiations of World Bank and the signing of Indus Waters Agreement (Wolf, 
1998). On the contrary, war broke out about the waters of Jordan River shared by Jordan, Syria and Israel, in the 
1950’s and 1960’s (Kliot, 1994). These military actions contributed to the tension that led to the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War (Gleick et al., 1994). In Ethiopia, during the drought of 2004-2006, there was significant fighting over water 
wells between local pastoral farmers and herders called “well warlords” and “well warriors”. The extensive fighting, 
known as the “War of the Well,” left over 250 dead and many injured (Kreamer, 2012). An interesting timeline of 
conflict events around world over irrigation water and other water conflict types has been developed by the Pacific 
Institute, showing detailed information about each conflict (Pacific Institute, 2014). 
3. Game theory 
3.1. Background 
Game theory (GT) is a mathematical method of problem analysis and decision making in strategic interaction. In 
other words, GT builds mathematical models and draws conclusions by studying situations/problems in which a 
group of people don't necessarily share the same interests and have to make decisions (interactive decision-making). 
Under a GT perspective, the outcome of a situation/problem (game) is determined by the moves (strategy) made by 
participants in the game (players). Each game consists of: 
 a set of players N = {1,2,…,i-1,i,i+1,…,n}, 
 a set of strategies for each player individually, i player has Si={S1,S2,…,Sk} strategies, and 
 a set of payoffs of each player for each set of strategies ui={u1,u2,…,uk} 
The process of setting up a game model includes defining players’ options and preferences. The aim of each 
player is to reach its expectations. GT allows simulation of the self-centered attitude of the involved players with a 
fairly realistic manner. In that context, GT methods compared to other conventional methods of strategic analysis, 
such as linear programming, provide better understanding of issues describing the competition and cooperation 
between players and make better estimations of the conflict outcome. However, it should be mentioned that GT is 
based on rationality. A GT simulation will work only if a) players act rationally, so as to maximize theirs payoffs 
and b) they believe that all the other players take rational decisions, too. Still, many decisions can be affected not 
only by rational judgments, but also by other factors, i.e. pressure, fears or aspiration, risk aversion, etc.  
As a scientific discipline, GT was introduced in the publication Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), finding application in economics. However, before this 
publication, several GT topics had been discussed, but not in a systematic way (Gura and Maschler, 2008). Even 
though GT is a relatively young branch of mathematics, through the passing of seventy years, it has been widely 
used in many other disciplines, such as political science, computer science, biology, psychology, sociology, and 
other fields. GT applications has been used as the means to understand many environmental issues, including water 
quantity and quality management, water allocation, water sharing, water diplomacy and many other fields. The 
following section discusses applications of GT in water irrigation issues. 
The fruitful contribution of GT in many scientific fields is demonstrated by the number of international awards, 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel, as recognition of scientific advances. From 1968 till today, thirteen game-theorists have 
received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. A famous winner is John Nash, who shared the Nobel Prize with 
John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten in 1994. The first awarded GT researcher was Paul A. Samuelson in 1970 and 
the last is Jean Tirole in 2014 (http://www.nobelprize.org/). 
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3.2. Taxonomy 
As Selten stated (1991), GT has been created as a theory of conflict and cooperation among rational individuals. 
This statement becomes more easily understood when studying the two main branches of GT: non-cooperative and 
cooperative game theory. The former analyses games where players interact with others in order to achieve their 
own goals without any coalitions or binding agreements and they act competitively. On the contrary, the latter 
analyses games where players are driven into mutually binding agreements (Gura and Maschler, 2008).  
Another classification of games is zero-sum and non-zero-sum games. Games that have winners and losers in the 
sense that one player “wins” only if the other “loses” are called zero-sum games. Zero-sum games were the first type 
of game to be studied formally. In contrast, in non-zero-sum games the gain by one player does not necessarily 
correspond with a loss by another (Webb, 2007). 
An additional branch of games is the following: static and dynamic games. Static games are actually one-shot 
games in which players play once with a single decision. Each player has no knowledge of the decision made by 
other players. So, decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. However, there are situations in which players' 
strategies depend on past moves. These cases are described by dynamic games (or sequential) in which players play 
over and over (Dinar and Albiac, 2009). 
There are many other distinctions between games, such as games with complete (perfect) or incomplete 
(imperfect) information in which the payoffs for each move is known or not by the players (Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1994). A classification of incomplete information games is the category of Bayesian games in which there is 
uncertainty about player's preferences and other important parameters of the game situation (Harshanyi, 1967). 
Another category is about stochastic games in which there are probabilistic transitions in the players' moves 
(Shapley, 1953) and fuzzy games that model the fuzziness in behavior of players (Billot, 1998). Differential games 
are those in which parameters, affecting players decisions, are governed by differential equations. Metagames study 
problems in a non-qualitative basis, through options method analysis (Howard, 1971). In this very coarse 
representation in the present manuscript, the described types of games are the most common in literature. Typical 
games that define the main concepts of GT are Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken Game, Matching Pennies, the Battle of 
Sexes, Hawks-Doves etc. The taxonomy list of GT is still long as the number of publications on GT has grown 
exponentially. As Madani and Hipel (2011) stated, the large variety of GT methods have been developed for 
addressing a wide variety range of conflict problems. 
4. Game theory & Irrigation 
4.1. Classic example games 
This sub-section illustrates the basic concepts of GT, by presenting simple and figurative games of competition 
and cooperation in irrigation. These games depict how strategic interactions among players result in non predictable 
situations with respect to the preferences of the players.  
Pumping groundwater game: This game (Fig. 2a) was introduced into water resources literature by Madani 
(2010) and follows the concept of Prisoner's Dilemma game. In this game, there are two farmers that share an 
aquifer in order to irrigate their crops. Each farmer has to choose between the cooperative and non-cooperative 
pumping rate. Pumping costs in cooperative rate are lower than in non-cooperative one. The higher the pumping 
cost the lower the groundwater table and, simultaneously, the lower the net benefits (profits) for each farmer. The 
best outcome for each farmer is to let the other farmer to commit for pumping at a low rate, while he pumps at the 
higher rate (acting as a free-rider). In contrast, if the two farmers cooperate and agree at a low pumping rate (and 
keep their commitment), then their payoffs will be lower. While the best strategy for both farmers is to cooperate, 
GT suggests that the two farmers lack of trust with each other and each individual farmer finds non-cooperation as 
strictly dominant strategy. Non-cooperation is the predicted outcome of the game and confirms Hardin's theory 
(1968), known as "Tragedy of the Commons", that describes the resources depletion and the social and 
environmental damage because of resources overexploitation. Hardin’s model (1968) and non-cooperative games 
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(like those following the reasoning of Prisoner’s dilemma) are closely related concepts to the free-rider problem 
(Ostrom, 1990). 
Water rights game: This game (Fig. 2b) was presented by Galaz (2004) and raises the question of cooperation or 
defection when the balance of water use is modified. In this game there are two players (a) a group of farmers and 
(b) an urban water company. At status quo the two water users have an agreement about the consumption of existed 
water resources. The game analyses what happens when one player (for example, the urban company) breaks this 
agreement. The other player can either accept the violation or not. The answer on this problem depends on the 
preference order of both players. 
4.2. Literature Evolution 
Decrease in exploitable freshwater resources (intended for agricultural use) and continuing increase in 
agricultural production needs have boosted the competition for irrigation water and raised many conflicts about 
water shares. In many developing countries, this problem is much more intense. That fact led many researchers to 
discuss that issue, trying to develop practical and sustainable solutions. Game theory applications are not excluded 
from this effort. Interesting reviews, concerning approaches and applications of GT to issues of water resources 
(among them irrigation), has been conducted by Parrachino et al. (2006) and by Herath (2006). 
One of the earliest studies in the context is that of Rogers (1969), who analyzed the disputes between India and 
Pakistan about the water of Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers that serve in irrigation and other water uses. Rogers 
demonstrated this international water conflict by using techniques of linear programming and GT. Another early 
publication is that of Bogardi and Szidarovsky (1976), which sets the definition problem about the equilibrium on 
water volume for irrigation purposes among farmers in a rather qualitative perspective about the goal function of 
each farmer's interest. In this article, the oligopoly model is suggested as applicable towards the solution of 
problems considering irrigation systems. Gisser and Sanchez (1980) described the problem of farmers pumping 
water from a common aquifer by presenting raised externalities. They tried to compare following strategies under no 
control (free marker) and optimal control by using deterministic equations (application in Pecos River Basin, New 
Mexico). They concluded that if the storage capacity of aquifer is relatively large, the exponents of the two models 
will be practically identical. On the contrary, Negri (1989) elaborated further the problem of using a common 
property aquifer. He reviewed the groundwater pumping model and examined the adopted pumping strategies in 
aquifer (with restricted access) by using differential open loop and feedback games. 
During 90's, literature is more focused in cooperative games about the use of irrigation water and incorporates 
environmental issues, as well. An interesting manuscript is that of Yaron and Ratner (1990). The two researchers 
examined the problem of increasing use in irrigation of low quality water (with high salinity). They applied their 
considerations into a quasi-empirical case in Israel (Negev area). They analyze the economic potential of 
cooperative associations and they calculated income distribution schemes among three farms with the aid of 
cooperative game theory algorithms. On the other hand, Dixon (1991) presented GT perspective for analyzing 
AF association of farmers 
UWC urban water company 
C cooperation 
D defect and challenge status quo 
PLR pumping at lower rate  
PHR  pumping at higher rate 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2. (a) Pumping groundwater game in strategic form; (b) Water rights game in extensive form 
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ground-water extraction and drainage water management, by illustrating different typed of behavior in players; 
myopic (i.e. players not adjust behavior when the water table is lowering), open-loop (i.e. player ignores the effect 
of pumping on the extraction costs of the other players), conventional closed-loop (i.e. player adjusts his behavior in 
response to the actions of the opponent), and trigger strategy (i.e. all farmers agree to pump in a collusive rate and 
trigger punishments if some farmers pump more). He concluded that trigger strategy equilibria may be difficult to 
implement, but should be applicable in ground-water extraction setting (application in San Joaquin Valley, Kern 
County, California). Dinar et al. (1992) presented two interesting empirical applications of cooperative GT over 
irrigation water under water scarcity and salinity. The first case study discusses the problem of reused water for 
irrigation and the second deals with inter-farm cooperation in water use for irrigation and the determination of the 
optimal water quantity and quality mix for each water user. Their study implied that cooperation increases the net 
benefit of farmers and the efficiency of water allocation. A quality-quantity groundwater problem in the context of 
irrigated agriculture is also analyzed empirically by Xepapadeas (1996) in Greece (Irakleio, Crete) where GT tools 
(non-cooperative game) were used in order to investigate regional profits over a fixed time horizon. His work tried 
also to set a regulatory framework (water tax) which could help in achieving efficient water allocation under the 
specific water consumption conditions in the area. 
Moreover, during 90's, articles about regulatory schemes over irrigation systems made use of methodologies from 
the toolbox of GT. An interesting example is the work of Weissing and Ostrom (1991) which is one of the first 
attempts that examined how irrigation institutions affect the distribution of equilibrium outcomes of irrigators. They 
combined game theory with policy analysis about irrigation issues. The two researchers examined irrigation games 
without guard positions and concluded that there is always some stealing concerning pumped water. They developed 
non-cooperative GT models to examine how stealing and monitoring rates are affected under different situations i.e. 
changes in number of irrigators, alterations in monitoring cost, different detection probabilities, different rewards 
when a stealing event is discovered etc. A similar attempt is that of Ostrom and Gardner (1993) who sketched 
asymmetries in irrigation systems between farmers located near the source of water (head-enders) and farmer placed 
in distance from it (tail-enders) and paid attention to the design of irrigation institutions and works. They concluded 
that bargaining between parties about allocation of water and maintenance of the irrigation system can benefit all 
sides. Empirical evidence in Tambesi irrigation system (Nepal) showed that design of institution that enforce rules 
among irrigators can enhance the agricultural yield. 
In the first decade of the new millennium, various GT applications to practical irrigation issues appeared in the 
literature. Concerning cost-sharing arrangements in irrigation systems, Dayton-Johnson approached the problem 
empirically through evidence from Mexico by publishing two articles. In the first one, he discussed water and cost 
allocation arrangements under different distributive rules (Dayton-Johnson, 2000a). In the second essay, the 
determinants of cooperation in a farmer-managed irrigation system are highlighted (Dayton-Johnson, 200b). On the 
other hand, Sakurai and Palanisami (2001) compared collective action in farming (tank irrigation) versus individual 
irrigation schemes (well irrigation) under the prismatic view of GT and applied their model (chicken game) in India 
(Tamil Nadu) where rice farming consumes a great amount of water. Posing the question tanks or well for local 
irrigation systems, they deducted that individualized irrigation systems are more preferable by the farmers to invest. 
However, their analysis indicated that neither tanks nor well will dominate the supply of water. Faysse (2003) 
explored the question about the best water allocation rule in farming when (i) farmers are autonomous in decision-
making regarding irrigation and (ii) a manager impose some rules about the water distribution to farmers and the 
fee-payments (application in El Melalasa, Kairouan, Tunisia). Cost-sharing rules over an irrigation ditch between 
head-enders and tail-enders were also discussed by Aadland and Kolpin (2004) in their econometric analysis based 
on fundamental GT concept from two surveys in south –central Montana, USA. Formulating water allocation 
decisions as a cooperative game in irrigated land of Kat River Basin in South Africa is surveyed by Dinar et al 
(2006). They compared their results with the results from a Role Playing Game and discussed the differences in 
these two procedures. Based on results of Dinar et al. (2006), a similar comparison between these two methods 
regarding common property water allocation among farmers in the Kat River Basin was made by Désolé (2007) in 
order to provide insights on the issue of game contextualization.  
Furthermore, during 2000-2010, we find many articles concerning irrigation water that combine GT applications 
with other innovative approaches. An interesting application is the work of Zorba et al. (2000 & 2001) in which 
farmers’ pumping strategies are following the pattern of Prisoner’s Dilemma game and genetic algorithms are used 
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as an optimization tool in order to maximize the number of farmers with increase in their income. A different 
demonstration of water sharing game for agriculture at international level is given by Just and Netanyahu (2004). 
They linked theory about interconnected games with real case conflict situations between Israel and Palestine, in 
order to examine negotiation feasibilities and infeasibilities. They modeled Israeli-Palestinian aquifer sharing as a 
Prisoner's dilemma. Another interesting article about irrigation that combines many GT applications is that of 
Salazar et al. (2007). They described a conflict resolution method applied to an irrigation district in Alto Rio Lerma 
Irrigation District, Mexico, regarding over-pumping and potential environmental risk, by using 4 different method 
solutions under different cropping patterns and chemical loading. Through this analysis they estimated the optimal 
groundwater withdrawals. A fuzzy GT approach combined with sequential bargaining games was described by 
Kerachian et al. (2010) who examined arising conflicts among water users and water agencies in Tehran, Iran. 
Since 2010, many articles on GT applications regarding irrigation water have been published. The article of 
Madani (2010) addresses several types of (and reasons for) conflicts over water issues and reviews applicability of 
game theory to conflict resolution by presenting simple water resource non-cooperative games. It has been ranked as 
one of the hottest articles of the Journal of Hydrology by Elsevier from its publication year till today. Janssen et al. 
(2011) studied asymmetries in strategies between head-enders and tail-enders in irrigation systems and discussed the 
dilemma of farmers regarding how much to invest in construction of shared infrastructure for irrigation purposes. 
One year later, Janssen et al. (2012a) elaborated further his previous work and discussed how cooperation among 
farmers evolve when head-enders and tail-enders face asymmetric dilemmas. Fair water allocation in farming under 
different allocation rules is also examined by Janssen et al. (2012b) who experiment their hypothesis in rural 
Colombia and Thailand. Results from experiments show the level of cooperation among farmers depend on the rate 
of trustworthiness among villagers in the community. The development of norms regarding fair water-sharing is a 
necessary condition of irrigation systems to self-organize. Yamamoto et al. (2012) applied simple GT (Prisoner's 
dilemma) to a water-shaving project (drip irrigation) in Tarim River Basin, China. They investigate the cost of work 
and maintenance in this project, water-fee reductions after the introduction of water-shaving irrigation and yield 
benefits. The analysis shows that the incentives for irrigators to follow a drip-irrigation plan are not high and 
proposes policies to solve this problem. Zaikin and Espínola-Arredondo (2012) present an experiment (non-
cooperative game) under with farmers from Uzbekistan (Dashtobod) in which water applied allocation norms 
embrace penalty and bonus rules. The experimental observations indicate ‘the carrot or the stick’ policy is effective 
in motivating irrigators to reduce water consumption. A work by Sechi et al. (2013) deals with water cost allocation 
arrangements in among competitive water requests for irrigation and civil/industrial use and applied the model in 
Sardinia, Italy under a cooperative GT approach. The applied methodology provides insights in rational and fair 
distribution of water resources. 
Recent publications about GT and irrigation are related one way or another with social learning and adapting 
behavior. Finger and Borer (2013) applied GT to identify the factors contributing to the continuation of traditional 
channel based irrigation systems in a rural area of Swiss territory (canton of Valais) even though irrigation is not 
profitable for the majority of community. Kimmich (2013) associates groundwater irrigation with electricity policies 
for irrigation in India (Andhra Pradesh) and presents a situation of social learning depicted as a sequential nested 
coordination game. Msangi (2014) discusses the learning behavior among farmer agents that pump from the same 
aquifer, in a non-cooperative manner. The researcher expands this model by incorporating uncertainty (stochastic 
equations) about the levels of inflow into the aquifer system and examines how players adapt into new situations of 
competitive extraction (application in Kern County, California, USA). Roseta-Palma et al. (2014) elaborate the 
problem of illegal groundwater pumping. They created a model of groundwater management that explicitly 
recognizes the existence of distinct groups of players (namely legal and illegal water users) and analyze adaptive 
behavior of irrigators under the supervision of a regulator/social planner that poses economic and social penalties to 
illegal users. 
5. Conclusions 
Water conflicts have increased over the last decades. Game theory is a rapidly advancing approach for analyzing 
conflicts over common pool resources, like water. GT applications in water resources literature cover a range of 
water resource problems in diverse categories and types (Madani, 2010). Regarding irrigation, GT applications 
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address issues associated with the concept of a) fair and equitable water allocation, b) balanced cost allocation 
among irrigators, c) equilibriums on water withdrawals and environmental sustainability. Whether the game is static 
or dynamic, whether the users are cooperative or competitive, whether the equations are deterministic or fuzzy, GT 
could provide insights in strategic interaction of farm agents that have to decide upon the operation of their irrigation 
systems and to develop broadly acceptable solutions.  
The purpose of the paper is to review the literature about GT and irrigation and water-related issues. Presenting 
the evolution of GT articles in literature discussing matters over irrigation water, a transition of argued issues 
becomes apparent. Premature works use more descriptive methods, but give less emphasis on environmental adverse 
effects of water overexploitation. Over the passing of years, as environmental problems became more intense, 
researchers incorporated in their equation-models more environmental parameters. Afterward, the discussion is 
focused on water allocation issues, given narrow water resources for irrigation purposes. This discussion is moved to 
cost allocation issues, under more sophisticated econometric analyses, in which the factor of uncertainty is 
investigated. Simultaneously, issues about the operation and management of self-organized irrigation systems and 
irrigation institutions become more open to debate. Last years, discussed conflicts over irrigation water are not 
limited to sharing of costs/benefits or management issues, but are extended to other social and political aspects of 
decision-making, like social learning and adaptive behavior of players. It is noticeable that the majority of works is 
focused more on over-pumping from aquifers and less on withdrawals from surface water. It is also noteworthy, that 
the majority of empirical cases and approaches are referred in developing countries, where access to water resources 
(in quantity and quality) is lacking or highly variable. Trying to classify the main water management problems, it 
seems that so far literature addresses issues/conflicts regarding water/cost allocation, groundwater management, 
balancing water quality-quantity issues, institutional arrangements and social learning.  
By documenting articles in the literature on GT dealing with irrigation issues, we understand that there is a 
pluralism of addressed subjects regarding water for agriculture and conflicts over its use, allocation, cost and policy 
action. This fact illustrates the utility of GT and indicates the great potentials of GT processes to understand 
complex problems about irrigation water and to improve agriculture governance. 
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